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RE-EVALUATING HOLDER ACTIONS: GIVING
DEFRAUDED SECURITIES HOLDERS A
FIGHTING CHANCE
Robert W Taylo*
INTRODUCTION

On November 8, 2001, Enron admitted that it had overstated its
profit by more than half a billion dollars over the previous five years.1
For many months leading up to this admission-and even the day
of-the vast majority of securities analysts, relying on the fraudulent
information provided by Enron, had recommended buying or holding Enron's stock.2 Less than a month after investors learned the
truth about Enron's financial condition, the company filed for Chap3
ter 11 bankruptcy.
While the destructive fallout from Enron's collapse is difficult to
overstate, perhaps no one suffered more direct and palpable harm
than those who relied on Enron's fraudulent misrepresentations and
invested in the company. 4 Enron's shareholders included not only
independent individual and corporate investors, but also those who
held shares in mutual funds-which widely invested in Enron 5-and
thousands of Enron employees, who had significant portions of their
*
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Wake Forest University, 2008. I would like to thank Professor VincentJohnson for his
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1 See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Admits to Overstating
Profits by About $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at Cl.
2 See Dan Ackman, Enron Analysts: We Was Duped, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2002), http://
www.forbes.com/2002/02/27/0227analysts.html.
3 Enron: The Amazing DisintegratingFirm, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2001, at 62, 62.
4 See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Plenty of Pain to Go Around for Small Investors, Funds,
Workers and Creditors,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at C8 (discussing the widespread losses
suffered by investors).
5 See id.
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retirement savings tied up in Enron stock and held in their 401(k)
6
accounts.
Thousands of Enron investors turned to the judicial system for
relief, bringing class action suits to seek redress for the losses they
suffered because of Enron's fraud. 7 While these actions initially
achieved a considerable amount of success, 8 later efforts at recovery
were thwarted by recent developments in federal law, leaving countless defrauded shareholders with little recourse. 9
The problem largely centers on the existence and application of
the "purchaser-seller rule," or the Birnbaum rule, in federal law. 10
Originally articulated by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp." and later endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,12 the rule holds that a person who is
neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities may not bring an action
3
under the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Rule 10b-5.1
In other words, a company's fraudulent misrepresentation regarding
its financial condition must induce the plaintiff to either purchase or
sell that company's securities in order for the plaintiff to have stand14
ing to sue under federal securities law.
This rule was intended to prevent various problems believed to be
inherent in securities fraud suits that are not tied to a specific transaction. In establishing the rule, courts primarily feared "strike suits"'1 5 or

vexatious litigation brought for the purpose of forcing an inequitable
settlement as well as conjectural or speculative claims.' 6 While the
rule may have been the product of good intentions, its effect has been
6

See
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THE ENRON BANKRUPTCY AND EMPLOYER STOCK IN RETIREMENT PLANs 1

(2002), availa-

ble at fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9102.pdf; Gilpin, supra note 4.
7 See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA"
Litig.) (Enron 1), 490 F. Supp. 2d 784, 786-88 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
8 See Bill Hensel, Jr., Settlement Adds $2.4 Billion to the Kitty, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 3,

2005, at DI (reporting that shareholder-plaintiffs in Enron-related class actions had
obtained over seven billion dollars in settlements).
9 See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec.) (Enron I1), 535 F.3d
325, 340 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that Enron shareholders' state class action suit was

preempted by federal law).
10
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to severely limit meritorious "holder" causes of action-that is, actions
where the shareholder-plaintiff alleges that the defendant's misrepresentation induced him to continue holding his stock when he would
have otherwise purchased or sold and seeks to recover for the diminished value of the stock suffered as a result.' 7 Since holders of stock
are neither purchasers nor sellers for purposes of Rule 10b-5,18 the
Birnbaum rule and subsequent judicial and congressional actions have
deprived countless numbers of shareholders of redress for their injuries. And while the injuries suffered by holders do not stem directly
from an induced purchase or sale of stock, they are no less palpable.
In the case of Enron, the company's stock traded near ninety dollars
per share at its height in August 2000-when the company was artificially inflating its stock prices through fraudulent statementsg-but
by December 2002, after the fraud had been disclosed, the price fell
to just over six cents. 20 For long-term stockholders who had invested

significant portions of their wealth in the company, Enron's fraudu21
lent scheme was devastating.
While many of the concerns that courts have expressed about
holder actions are legitimate,2 2 the dangers of such actions are largely
overstated, and as this Note will show, taking away holders' right to
sue creates far greater dangers and potential for injustice. Part I
addresses the development of the law in this area while Part II illustrates the current state of the problem, and Part III suggests possible
judicial and legislative solutions.
I.

BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW

A.

Rule lOb-5 and the Blue Chip Stamps Doctrine

Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5 states:
17 See Enron I, 490 F. Supp. 2d 784, 787 n.4 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
18 See, e.g., Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1260 (Cal. 2003).
19 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
20 Enron CorporationCommon Stock HistoricalPrice Table, GUARDI & Co. LLC, 33-38,
http://www.gilardi.com/pdf/enrol3ptable.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2010).
21 See Dennis J. Buckley, Enron: Where Is It Today?, MARTINDALE.COm (April 8,
2004), http://www.martindale.com/bankruptcy-law/article-Buchanan-IngersollRooney-PC_64920.htm ("If you read the message boards on public sites such as CBS
MarketWatch, you can get a glimpse of the pathos and despair of those left holding
practically valueless Enron stock.").
22 SeeJoshua D. Fulop, Agency Costs and the Strike Suit: Reducing FrivolousLitigation
Through Empowerment of Shareholders, 7J. Bus. & SEC. L. 213, 215-16, 221-22 (2007)
(noting the dangers of strike suits in securities litigation).
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
23
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Although not explicitly stated, courts have long held that the rule
implies a private cause of action that allows individuals to supplement
the SEC's enforcement with private lawsuits. 24 However, this implied
cause of action has been limited from very early on in its existence.
Since the Birnbaumrule was first articulated in 1952, courts have interpreted the "in connection with the purchase or sale" language to
require that a fraudulent statement must induce either a specific
purchase or sale of securities in order to be actionable under Rule
1Ob-5.

25

Courts have offered various justifications for the Birnbaum rule.
In the seminal case, the Second Circuit based its reasoning largely on
legislative history and intent, 26 while the Supreme Court in Blue Chip
Stamps offered ajustification that was primarily based on policy consid23

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (emphasis added).

24 See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,13 n.9
(1971); cf.J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (finding a private cause of
action implicit in Section 14(a)), abrogated by Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 577 (1979) ("We do not now question the actual holding of that case, but we
decline to read the opinion so broadly that virtually every provision of the securities
Acts gives rise to an implied private cause of action.").
25 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975).
Interestingly, although Blue Chip Stamps is widely cited as the Supreme Court's disapproval of holder actions, the case was not a holder action at all. The plaintiff was
offered stock in a stamp corporation, but declined the offer, allegedly because of a
misleadingly pessimistic prospectus. See id. at 725-27. Although the plaintiff was
never a holder of the corporation's stock, the Supreme Court sweepingly disapproved
of holder actions, along with the case in question. See id. at 754-55.
26 See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952) ("The
absence of a ... provision in Section 10(b) [explicitly giving shareholders a right of
action] strengthens the conclusion that that section was directed solely at that type of
misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase
of securities ....").
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erations. 27 The Court was concerned that permitting causes of action
outside the narrow purchaser-seller context would invite vexatious litigation and strike suits, 28 encourage the "extensive discovery and disruption of normal business activities," 29 and create "conjectural and
speculative" recoveries because the number of shares a plaintiff in 3a0
holder action alleges he would have sold is a "subjective hypothesis."
B.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

Judicial concerns about plaintiffs abusing private securities litigation 31 soon brought about legislative action as well. In the mid 1990s,
the corporate lobby went to Washington to petition for stricter federal
regulations on securities litigation, complaining that its members were
being harassed by frivolous class action lawsuits brought by securities
holders who were more concerned with the suits' settlement values
than their merits. 32 Despite the inconclusive nature of the evidence
purportedly supporting a "securities litigation crisis," 33 Congress soon
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("Reform
35
Act") 34 over President Clinton's veto.
The Reform Act "continue[d] a judicial trend toward narrowing
the availability of relief for investors under the federal securities
laws" 36 by making a number of significant changes to the private
securities fraud class action litigation system.3 7 Among the most significant changes implemented by the Reform Act were (1) a "safe har27

See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740-49.
28 Id. at 740.
29 Id. at 742-43.
30 Id. at 735.
31 See supra Part I.A.
32 See David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California'sBlue Sky Laws, 54 Bus. LAW. 1, 1-2 (1998).
33 SeeJohn W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the
Private SecuritiesLitigationReform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAw. 335, 339-341 (1996). Avery
notes that at Senate hearings regarding this matter, much of the testimony involved
anecdotal evidence, and that empirical evidence was weak. See id.; see also GARY W.
SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT: SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM 34
(1995) ("On balance, the evidence does not appear to be compelling enough for one
to definitively assert that warrantless class action suits have exploded.").
34 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
35 WilliamJ. Clinton, Veto Message (Dec. 19, 1995) ("I am not... willing to sign
legislation that will have the effect of closing the courthouse door on investors who
have legitimate claims. Those who are the victims of fraud should have recourse in
our courts."), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. H15,214-15 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
36 Levine & Pritchard, supra note 32, at 4-5.
37 See id.
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bor" for forward-looking statements that were not known to be false
when made or were accompanied by meaningful cautionary language;3 8 (2) heightened pleading standards, whereby plaintiffs must
plead facts which give rise to a "strong inference" that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind for fraud;3 9 (3) a stay of discovery provision that prohibits plaintiffs from having access to discovery
while a motion to dismiss is pending;40 and (4) a lead plaintiff presumption, which designates the plaintiff with the largest financial
stake in the litigation as the lead plaintiff and allows that lead plaintiff
41
to select counsel for the class, subject to court approval.
The Reform Act's restrictions on federal shareholder class
actions, coupled with Blue Chip Stamps and other recent Supreme
Court cases limiting the ability of shareholders to sue in federal
court, 4 2 led defrauded shareholders to seek redress for their grievances in state court.43 Holder actions in state courts initially achieved

a considerable amount of success because state common law often recognized holder claims, or state securities fraud statutes-more com45
monly known as "blue sky laws" 44-specifically provided for them.
However, this avenue of relief did not remain as favorable to shareholders for long.
C.

The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998

Not long after significantly curtailing investors' right and ability
to sue in federal court, Congress limited their ability to sue in state
38 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c) (2006).
39 Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
40 Id. § 77z-1 (b). The stay of discovery provision ensures, as a practical matter,
that every complaint will be met with a motion to dismiss and that plaintiffs cannot
use the discovery process to make an adequate complaint. See Levine & Pritchard,
supra note 32, at 4.
41 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (a) (3). This provision was designed to ensure that large institutional investors would lead securities class actions. See Levine & Pritchard, supra
note 32, at 4-5.
42 See Levine & Pritchard, supra note 32, at 5 n.23 (listing cases in which federal
courts have been resistant to holder claims).
43 See Jones, supra note 10, at 606.
44 Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism:PreemptingPrivate State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 279 (1998).
45 See, e.g., Rogers v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1311 n.13 (N.D. Fla.
2003) (noting that Florida common law recognizes "holding claim[s]"); Small v. Fritz
Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1258-59 (Cal. 2003) (holding that California common law recognizes holder actions); see also Enron 1, 490 F. Supp. 2d 784, 818-19 (S.D. Tex. 2007)
(noting that, although "the express language of the Texas statutes excludes 'holder'
claims," such claims have been brought under Texas common law).
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courts as well. After the passage of the Reform Act, the corporate
lobby, led by Silicon Valley, returned to Washington to petition for
further legislative action in response to what it viewed as the plaintiffs'
46
bar using state law to circumvent the restriction of the Reform Act.
Congress responded by passing the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 ("Uniform Standards Act").47
The Uniform Standards Act expressly preempts certain state law
securities class actions by providing for automatic removal to federal
court, followed by dismissal. 48 The Act applies to any "covered class
action" that alleges
(A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or
49
sale of a covered security.
The Act defines "covered class actions" as
(i) any single lawsuit in which(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or
prospective class members, and questions of law or fact common to
those persons or members of the prospective class, without reference to issues of individualized reliance on an alleged misstatement
or omission, predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons or members; or
(II) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a
representative basis on behalf of themselves and other unnamed
parties similarly situated, and questions of law or fact common to
those persons or members of the prospective class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual persons or members; or
(ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court and
involving common questions of law or fact, in which(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons; and

46 SeeJones, supra note 10, at 606-07; Leslie Eaton, The Silicon Valley Gang: An
Influential Industry with Lots of Money Is GettingIts Way on CapitolHil4 N.Y. TIMES, June

11, 1998, at D1.
47 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
48

See Amanda M. Rose, Life After SLUSA: What Is the Fate of Holding Claims?, 69
J. 455, 456 (2002).

DEF. COUNS.

49

15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (2006).
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(II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed
50
as a single action for any purpose.
For several years after the Uniform Standards Act came into existence, defrauded holders of securities continued to bring holder class
actions under state law with considerable success. This was due in
large part to widespread judicial determinations that, since the text of
the Uniform Standards Act explicitly limits its reach to actions based
on fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a security, 5'
52
holder claims should be exempt from its preemptive force.
One court to conclude that the Uniform Standard Act's preemption did not encompass holder claims was the Second Circuit in Dabit
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 53 In that case, a former
Merrill Lynch broker brought a class action suit under state law, alleging that Merrill Lynch's misleadingly positive stock assessments had
induced him to hold securities he would otherwise have sold. 54 In
holding that the action was not preempted, the court examined the
legislative history and intent underlying the Uniform Standards Act.
The court noted that the Act employs the same "in connection with a
purchase or sale" language as Rule 10b-5 and the language had
already been "extensively interpreted" by the Supreme Court in cases
such as Blue Chip Stamps at the time the Act was enacted. 55 The court
therefore concluded Congress intended to give the "in connection
with" language the same meaning that courts had given it in the Rule
10b-5 context, reasoning that "'where Congress uses terms that have
accumulated settled meaning under either equity or the common law,
50 Id. § 77p(f) (2) (A). The Act creates exceptions for certain types of actions,
including derivative actions and actions brought solely by states and pension plans.
See Levine & Pritchard, supra note 32, at 23-31.
51 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1).
52 See, e.g., Gordon v. Buntrock, No. 00 CV 303, 2000 WL 556763, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 28, 2000) ("Because Congress did not so provide [for the preemption of holder
claims], this court must conclude that the Uniform Standards Act subjects only those
actions in which the plaintiff alleges that misrepresentations occurred in connection
with the purchase or sale of a covered security to removal in federal court."); Small v.
Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1261 (Cal. 2003) (holding that the Uniform Standards Act
does not preempt holder actions, since the Act "by its terms applies only to suits
involving the purchase or sale of stock"). But see Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403
F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the Uniform Standards Act preempts
holder actions), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 633 (2006).
53 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
54 See id. at 27-28. For a more detailed discussion of the Dabit case, see Melanie
P. Goolsby, Note, Merrill Lynch v. Dabit: The Case of the Scorned Broker and the Death of
the State Securities Fraud Class Action Suit, 67 LA. L. REV. 227 (2006).
55 See Dabit, 395 F.3d at 34-35.
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a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress
' 56
means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.'
The court concluded that since Congress did not intend to assign new
meaning to this language, that clause's preemptive sweep must apply
only to class actions brought by purchasers or sellers of securities, and
holder claims must not be preempted. 57 Furthermore, the court
noted that it must operate under "'the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by [a] Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' "58
Since there was no clear legislative intent to preempt holder claims,
but rather an apparent intent to preempt only those claims that could
have been brought in federal court to begin with, the Act could not
59
preempt holder claims.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether state
law holder claims were preempted by the Uniform Standards Act and
reversed the Second Circuit's ruling, holding that state-law holder
actions like the one in that case were preempted. 60 The Court
rejected the Second Circuit's holding that the "in connection with"
language should be given the same narrow meaning assigned to it by
the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps, reasoning that the purchaserseller limitation on lOb-5 actions endorsed by the Court in Blue Chip
Stamps was based on policy considerations rather than statutory interpretation. 6 1 The Court insisted that when it had interpreted the "in
connection with" language in the context of Rule lOb-5, it had given it
a broad interpretation. 62 Relying on its ruling in United States v.
O'Hagan,6 3 the Court reasoned that the "in connection with a
56 Id. at 35 (quoting Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d
1334, 1342 (lth Cir. 2002)).
57 See id. at 39-40.
58 Id. at 41 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981)).
59 See id. at 42 ("[The Reform Act,] 'if enacted, will allow Congress to address this
State litigation problem.., in a very targeted and narrow way, essentially preempting
only those class actions that have recently migrated to State court, while leaving traditional State court actions and procedures solidly in place.'" (second alteration in original) (quoting 143 CONG. REC. S10,477 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Christopher Dodd))).
60 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 74 (2006).
Interestingly, Justice Sotomayor, who authored the Second Circuit's opinion in this
case, was recently elevated to the position of Supreme Court Justice. Perhaps if the
Court were to revisit this issue in the near future, it would reach a different
conclusion.
61 See id. at 84.
62 See id. at 85.
63 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 86: 1

purchase or sale" language of Rule 10b-5-and by extension, the Uniform Standards Act-is satisfied when the alleged fraud merely "coin64
cides" with a securities transaction.
Although the Second Circuit concluded that Dabit's claims were
not preempted in part because they did not sufficiently "coincide"
with the purchase or sale of a security, the Supreme Court declined to
review this portion of the holding. 65 Rather, the Court reiterated the
policy concerns regarding holder claims that were expressed in Blue
Chip Stamps and decided that "[i] t would be odd, to say the least, if
[the Uniform Standards Act] exempted that particularly troublesome
66
subset of class actions from its pre-emptive sweep."
As for the presumption noted by the Second Circuit "'that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action,"' 67 the
Court favored form over substance by holding that this presumption
did not apply because the Act "does not actually pre-empt any state
cause of action .... [but] simply denies plaintiffs the right to use the
class-action device to vindicate certain claims." 68
In vacating the judgment of the Second Circuit, the Court ruled
that the Uniform Standards Act preempts holder actions brought
under state law. In doing so, it effectively read the "in connection
with [a] purchase or sale" requirement right out of the statute.
II.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT PROBLEM

The story of the law's development in the area of securities fraud
holder claims is the story of individual investors gradually losing their
rights and opportunities to seek relief when they are defrauded by the
very companies in which they have entrusted their fortunes. The Blue
Chip Stamps doctrine took away the right to sue in federal court under
Rule lOb-5, and the Uniform Standards Act and its judicial interpretation have severely constrained their ability to sue in state court. While
the holder action has not been completely eliminated, 69 holders'
options are now extremely limited. The problem stems largely from
the fact that, in efforts to prevent vexatious litigation or "strike suits,"
Congress and the courts have eliminated nearly all holder actions64 Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85 (citing O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 651).
65 Id. at 77 n.3.
66 Id. at 86 (citing Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d

478, 484 (7th Cir.
2005)).
67 Id. at 87 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).

68 Id.
69 See John C. Coffee Jr. & Stefan Paulovic, The Future of Class Actions, in CLAss
ACTION LITIGATION 2008, at 193, 235 (PLI Litig. &Admin. Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. 14,175, 2008).
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rather than merely the frivolous ones. These actions prevent even the
70
most meritorious claims from being litigated.
A.

Holders' Insufficient Opportunitiesfor Redress

Some commentators have noted that even in the wake of the
Supreme Court's Dabit ruling, defrauded holders of securities still
retain the right to bring suit in state court in their individual capacity
or in classes of less than fifty people. 7 1 While this may be true, the
72
individual suit is not a feasible option for most individual investors.
Since the majority of corporations are owned by diffuse shareholders 3-that is, a large number of shareholders who each own a small
number of shares-it is not feasible for most shareholders to invest
the substantial time or resources necessary to litigate a securities fraud
case on their own, and investors may be forced to bear the losses they
incurred as a result of the fraud perpetrated upon them.
Limiting holder-plaintiffs to individuals and those in classes of
fifty or less leads to inequitable results. In practice, the only plaintiffs
likely to be able to litigate cases on their own are large institutional
investors,74 while individuals who hold a relatively small number of
shares, yet bear their losses personally and directly are left without
recourse. Allowing shareholders to bring suit in small groups of up to
fifty is not much better. Large public corporations may have
thousands of shareholders whose interests cannot be adequately represented by a class of fifty or fewer plaintiffs. Furthermore, placing
such a limitation on the size of permissible class actions ensures that
only large individual and institutional shareholders will be represented in the class. Since plaintiffs' attorneys in securities class action
suits generally work on a contingency fee basis, 75 they will have a
strong incentive to recruit only the fifty largest shareholders possible
for the class action. Small individual shareholders-such as the lowlevel Enron employees whose retirement savings were lost when
70 See generally Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 711 (1996) (discussing the need to strike a balance between preventing meritless strike suits and encouraging meritorious claims).
71 See Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 69, at 235; Goolsby, supranote 54, at 251-52.
72 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as PragmaticEx Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REv. 63, 126 (2008) ("Absent securities class actions, vindicating
rights is not economically feasible.").
73 See Raymond K. Van Ness & Charles F. Seifert, Boards of Directors and Corporate
Performance:An Analysis Model, 7 REv. Bus. REs., no. 3, 2007, at 11, 12.
74 See Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 69, at 234-35.
75 See Burch, supra note 72, at 75 & n.48.
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Enron's stock plummeted 76-will almost certainly be excluded from
the holder class actions and be left with no remedy by which to
recover their losses.
Furthermore, the fifty-plaintiff limitation creates perverse incentives for corporations contemplating acts of fraud. Since only fifty
holders will be able to sue regardless of the size of the scheme perpetrated, firms that engage in fraud will have an incentive to ensure that
the fraud is perpetrated on a grand scale. Because their revenue will
potentially increase with the number of shareholders they are able to
deceive, but their costs remain fixed at a low rate-since they will only
have to compensate fifty shareholders at most-corporations engaging in fraud will have an incentive to defraud as many holders as
possible.
And while in theory it may be possible for many small groups of
defrauded shareholders to file separate suits against the same corporation, this does not appear to be a viable strategy in practice. The Fifth
Circuit addressed this issue in a 2008 Enron holder class action appeal
brought under state law. 77 In that case, a law firm brought numerous
holder class actions throughout several counties in the state of Texas
on behalf of former Enron shareholders. 78 Although there were over
750 plaintiffs, the firm assigned less than fifty plaintiffs to each individual action in an effort to circumvent the preemption provisions of the
Uniform Standards Act. 79 Upon removal, the district court consoli-

dated the actions and subsequently dismissed them, holding that the
actions were preempted. 80 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal,
holding that since the actions were pending in the same court and the
plaintiffs had been acting in unison throughout the litigation, they
were "proceed[ing] as a single action"8 1 and were thus preempted by
the Uniform Standards Act.
This issue was also addressed in a case involving holders of
WorldCom stock, 82 which had become valueless after WorldCom
executives engaged in a fraudulent scheme to manipulate public fil76 See Gilpin, supra note 4.
77 See Enron II, 535 F.3d 325, 331-33 (5th Cir. 2008).
78 Id. at 332.
79 Id.
80 See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.),
Nos. H-01-3624, H-03-1087, H-03-3320, H-03-5332, H-03-5333, H-03-5334, H-03-5335,
H-04-3330, 04-3331, 04-4455, H-01-3914, 2006 WL 3716669, at *5-9 (S.D. Tex. Dec.
12, 2006), affd, Enron II, 535 F.3d 325.
81 Enron I, 535 F.3d at 340 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f) (5) (B) (ii) (2006)).
82 See Bell v. Ebbers (In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig.) ( Worldcom 1), 308 F. Supp.
2d 236, 241-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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ings concerning its financial condition, and the company subsequently filed for bankruptcy. 8 3 In that case, ten securities fraud class
actions of forty-eight or less plaintiffs each were filed in separate state
courts. 84 The actions were removed as related to the WorldCom bank-

ruptcy, and the district court consolidated them for pretrial proceedings.85 The district court then dismissed the actions, holding that due
to the consolidation and the fact that they were "proceed [ing] jointly
as a single action," they were preempted by the Uniform Standards
Act.8

6

Accordingly, it appears to be fairly well settled that plaintiffs

may not circumvent the Act's limitation on the number of plaintiffs in
a state law holder class action by bringing numerous small actions
rather than one large one.
B.

Undermining the Enforcement of Securities Laws and Deterrence of
Fraud

The Uniform Standards Act's limitation on the number of shareholders that may bring a holder class action under state law also
undercuts the ability of private litigation to act as an enforcement
mechanism for antifraud laws. At least since JI. Case Co. v. Boraks 7 in
1964, the Supreme Court has recognized a private cause of action for
fraud under federal securities laws, 8 8 and the tort of fraud has existed
in the common law for far longer.8 9 Private litigation under federal
securities law has long been recognized as an important supplement
to public enforcement by the SEC. 90 With all of the publicly traded
83 See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig. ( Worldcom II), 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634-35
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing the WorldCom fraud scheme).

84 Worldcom I, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
85 Id. at 238-39.
86 Id. at 247.
87 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
88 See id. at 430-31. The first judicial recognition of a private right of action
under federal securities laws was in 1947 in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512 (E.D. Pa. 1947). See Nishal Ray Ramphal, The Role of Public and Private Litigation in the Enforcement of Securities Laws in the United States 13 (Aug. 2007)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pardee RAND Graduate School), availableat http://
www.rand.org/pubs/rgs-dissertations/ 2007/RANDRGSD224.pdf.
89 See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 189 (2007) ("The tort
of fraud is so basic that it is one of the most longstanding legal doctrines in our
Western society. There is evidence of a 'writ of deceit' as early as 1201.").
90 See Borak, 377 U.S. at 432 (noting that private litigation is a "most effective
weapon" in the enforcement of securities laws); Securities Fraud Litigation: Hearing on
H.A. 417 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 5-9 (1994) (testimony of Leonard B. Simon, Partner, Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach) (noting the importance of private litigation as an enforce-

ment mechanism for securities laws); Ramphal, supra note 88, at 11-14.
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companies in the United States, 9 1 it would be difficult or impossible
for the SEC to adequately monitor them all for fraudulent activity on
its own. As a result, private litigation has become an important mechanism for ensuring corporate accountability and compliance with the
law. By strictly limiting the class of plaintiffs who can participate in
the litigation process to purchasers and sellers, the federal government prevents thousands of investors from assisting the SEC with its
enforcement duties and thus undermines the well-established system
for enforcing federal securities laws.
Even if securities holders exercise other means of helping the
SEC to enforce the securities laws-such as reporting instances of
fraud directly to the Commission 9 2-the deterrent effect of private
class action litigation will still be constrained. Private litigation is
important not only as an ex post remedy for compensating shareholders and enforcing securities laws, but also as a means of deterring
companies from engaging in fraudulent and illegal behavior. It is
plausible to assume that those who commit white-collar crimes, such
as securities fraud, act as rational, cost-benefit calculators. 93 Thus, a
corporate executive's decision to engage in securities fraud or refrain
from it will likely be heavily influenced by the potential gains to be
had relative to the costs he expects to bear if he is caught. 94 Taking all
other variables-including the actor's scruples-as exogenous, the
potential fraudfeasor will commit the crime only if the expected gain
(g) is greater than the expected cost (c) times the probability of getting caught (p), where g > cp.95 The optimal punishment is reached
when the potential offender is forced to internalize the entire cost of
his crime, by making the expected cost to the offender (cp) equal to
the entire harm caused by the fraud (h) .96 In this scenario, where cp =
h, the fraudfeasor will commit the fraud only when the gain exceeds
97
the total harm, or g > h, which is the efficient level of deterrence. If
the expected cost is set higher than the harm, it is possible to cause
overdeterrence. For instance, corporate executives may become too
91 In 2002, there were 2783 companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange
alone. NYSE Number of Listed Companies (1929-2002), NYSE TECHS., http://
www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer-edition.asp?mode=table
&key=3010&category=5 (last visited Nov. 27, 2010).
92 See SEC Centerfor Complaints and Enforcement Tips, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/complaint.shtml (last modified July 21, 2010).
93 See THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 289 (2004).
94 See id. at 288-90.
95 See id. at 289.
96 See id. at 291.
97 See id.
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wary of liability to make any forward-looking assessments whatsoever
regarding their company's financial condition. 98 This would deprive
investors of potentially valuable market information. 99 However,
because the law already contains mechanisms that protect against this
type of danger, such as the safe harbor provisions of the Reform
Act, 1°0 overdeterrence is less of a concern than underdeterrence. Furthermore, overdeterrence is a concern most closely associated with
negligent conduct, and because fraud is intentional conduct, the possibility of overdeterrence is not a significant cause for concern. 10 1
Therefore, the law should err on the side of overdeterrence, rather
than underdeterrence, in this regard.
However, by severely constraining holders' ability to sue for losses
they suffer as a result of corporate fraud, Congress and the courts
have effectively allowed corporations to defraud huge groups of investors without any fear of having to compensate the victims and have
likely lowered the expected cost of committing securities fraud to well
below the optimal level. Given the large scale and the high stakes of
the claims that have now been nearly eliminated,10 2 the expected cost
may now be set at a dangerously low level. It may be possible to compensate for effectively eliminating this class of potential plaintiffs by
using other forms of punishment-such as fines and imprisonmentl 3-to increase the expected cost of the fraud. 10 4 However,
there does not appear to be any evidence that the SEC has increased
the amount of fines or prison sentences it has levied in recent years in
response to the Supreme Court's ruling that the Uniform Standards
Act preempts state law holder actions. Furthermore, private litigation
98 See Rose, supra note 48, at 462.
99 See id.
100 See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2006).
101 SeeJill E. Fisch, Causefor Concern: Causationand FederalSecurities Fraud,94 IOWA
L. REV. 811, 860-64 (2009).
102 See, e.g., Enron II, 535 F.3d 325, 336-42 (5th Cir. 2008); WorldCom I, 308 F.
Supp. 2d 236, 241-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
103 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.), for example, significantly increased the criminal penalties for committing fraud. See Gary M. Brown,
Fraudand Related Issues UnderRule lOb-5 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in 2 UNDERSTANDING
THE SECURITIES LAws 2009, at 57, 108-12 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1757, 2009).
104 In the case of Enron, for example, Kenneth Lay, the former chairman and
CEO, was convicted of multiple counts of fraud and faced twenty-five years or more in
prison, though he died before he could be sentenced. See Kate Murphy, Judge Throws
Out Kenneth Lay's Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, at C3; John C. Roper, Sentencingfor Lay, Skilling Pushed Back, Hous. CHRON., June 17, 2006, at DI.
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carries a benefit that fines and imprisonment do not-that is, restitution for the victims. When shareholders can sue those that defrauded
them, they stand to actually recoup their losses-or at least a portion
of them. When the government fines corporate executives or throws
them in prison, however, investors do not get their money back.
Private enforcement carries other potential advantages over public enforcement as well. The direct financial interest that the plaintiffs
have in the litigation helps to promote rigorous enforcement through
zealous advocacy. Furthermore, private litigation is arguably more
equitable as an enforcement tool than public prosecution because the
costs of private litigation are borne largely by the parties to the litigation and their attorneys, 10 5 while public enforcement is funded by the
public at large. Thus, with private litigation, enforcement of the
securities laws is funded directly by those with the most direct interest
in the enforcement. This creates a more equitable result by recon10 6
ciling the burdens of enforcement with its benefits.
C.

Federalism Concerns

The federal government's sweeping preemption of holder actions
brought under state law raises significant federalism issues. 10 7 The
primary concerns are the federal government's usurpation of an area
of traditional importance for state law, the loss of "interjurisdictional
competition," and the loss of states' ability to act as "laboratories of
experimentation."
Securities fraud is an area of historical concern and importance
for state law. State "blue sky laws" predate federal securities legislation, with the first state securities fraud statute appearing in Kansas in
1911.108 By the time Congress enacted the Securities Act of 19331°9the first federal legislation regulating the purchase and sale of securi105

See James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of CorporateMisconduct, 60

LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8-10, 36-37 (1997).
106 Cf VINCENT R.JOHNSON, STUDIELS IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 8 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that the reconciliation of the burdens of an activity with its benefits is an important policy consideration in tort law).

107 See generally Perino, supra note 44, at 273-88 (discussing federalism issues
related to securities litigation); Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: ProtectingShareholderRights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 215, 216-25 (1999) (discussing the traditional roles of federal and state governments in corporate governance).

108 See Perino, supra note 44, at 279-80.
109 See ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(2006)).
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ties' 1 0 -every state except Nevada had already enacted securities regulations.1 11 These state laws provided significant guidance to the
drafters of subsequent federal legislation. 11 2 For most of the twentieth century, the federal government respected the importance of state
law in the area of securities regulation, with Congress continually
deferring to state law by declining to enact a federal incorporations
act, and federal courts often limiting the reach of federal securities
laws in order to preserve the benefits of federalism and state autonomy. 1 13 In fact, the Court in Blue Chip Stamps recognized that its
endorsement of the purchaser-seller requirement for Rule 10b-5
actions could well deprive some deserving plaintiffs of their ability to
recover damages,1 14 but noted that there was little danger of this injustice occurring because defrauded stockholders still retained the right
to sue under state securities law. 1 15 Thus, the Court in Blue Chip
Stamps anticipated the importance of state law in providing defrauded
holders with opportunities for redress and eliminated their ability to
sue in federal court on the assumption that they would retain this
right under state law.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the
Uniform Standards Act has almost entirely eliminated a crucial state
law remedy for securities fraud. In contrast to the Blue Chip Stamps
Court, the Court in Dabit casually discounted the importance of state
law to holder class actions, and securities law generally.11 6 In making
its decision, the Court noted that Dabit and his amici identified only
one state law holder class action brought during the years between7
1
Blue Chip Stamps and the enacting of the Uniform Standards Act.'
However, the fact that the state law holder class action was not a heavily utilized remedy during the years between 1975 and 1998 does not
110 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006).
111 See Perino, supra note 44, at 280.
112 See id.
113 See Thompson, supra note 107, at 222.
114 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738-39 (1975). The
SEC filed an amicus brief in that case also expressing this concern. See id. at 738; see
also Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1261 (Cal. 2003) ("In short, the high court's
decision in Blue Chip Stamps... did not view [policy] considerations as justification for
a total denial of relief to defrauded holders; it reasoned only that the federal courts

could deny a forum to wronged stockholders who are not sellers or buyers without
unjust consequences because these stockholders retained a remedy in state courts.").
115 See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 738 n.9.
116 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 88 (2006)
("[F]ederal law, not state law, has long been the principal vehicle for asserting classaction securities fraud claims.").
117 See id.
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undermine the importance of the remedy today or in the future. In
fact, this remedy is more important now than ever before, in light of
the unprecedented scale of corporate fraud in recent years from coma 8
panies such as Enron and WorldCom. 1
The preemption of state law holder actions also limits the ability
of state securities laws to create beneficial "interjurisdictional competition" among the states.'1 9 Like the market for corporate charters,
allowing defrauded shareholders to bring class actions under state law
may give rise to a market for state securities fraud actions.1 20 Since
state holder actions are likely to be brought under the law in which
the entity is incorporated, 1 2 1 states would have an incentive to ensure
that their corporate laws adequately protect the interests of shareholders. 122 Since it is generally advantageous for states when companies
incorporate under their laws, they would also have an incentive to
ensure that their laws governing holder actions also protect the interests of corporations.123 Thus, allowing holder actions under state law
could likely lead to more efficient securities regulations.
Similarly, allowing state courts to entertain holder class actions
would enable states to act as "laboratories for experimentation" for
these actions.' 24 Although the Supreme Court has expressed significant concerns about allowing holder actions, 125 there has been little
empirical testing of the Court's fears due to the historical rarity of
holder cases.' 26 Permitting holder actions in state courts would give
states a chance to test the legitimacy of these concerns, and if the
Court's fears prove to be well founded, state courts may develop effec118 See HARRY SHUTT, THE DECLINE OF CAPITALISM 94 (2005) (noting the recent
"unprecedented epidemic of corporate fraud and malfeasance").
119 See Rose, supra note 48, at 462.
120 See id. at 460-63.
121 See id. at 462.
122 See Douglas G. Smith, A Federalism-BasedRationalefor Limited Liability, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 649, 672 (2009) ("The fact that each state's laws may have an effect on its own
citizens should they hold stock in, or interact with, corporations that are incorporated
within the jurisdiction provides state actors with an incentive to protect the interests

of these constituencies . . ").
123 Cf Perino, supra note 44, at 322-28 (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of intejurisdictional competition for securities fraud actions).
124 Id. at 320; see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis,J, dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory. .. ").
125 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-49 (1975);
supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
126 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 88 (2006);
supra text accompanying notes 117-118.
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tive ways of addressing them-rather than simply eliminating holder
actions altogether.
Furthermore, the oft-raised argument against federalism-based
approaches to lawmaking, that having one set of standards is more
efficient, does not apply here. In allowing the Uniform Standards Act
to preempt state law holder causes of action, the federal government
did not create a new set of rules that trump state law rules. Rather, it
denied holders the right to seek relief in state court without creating

any corresponding federal alternative. 127 Thus, in preempting state
holder class actions, the federal government has sacrificed the significant benefits that accompany federalism without any corresponding
efficiency gains.1 28 By the same token, allowing holder class actions to
proceed in state court also would not subject corporations to "wasteful, duplicative litigation," 129 as the Supreme Court has suggested,
because would-be state court plaintiffs do not have a corresponding
remedy under federal law.
III.- POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A.

JudicialSolutions

Courts could solve the problems created by the effective elimination of the holder action either by abandoning the Dabit Court's
broad interpretation of the "in connection with" language of the Uniform Standards Act to allow holder class actions under state law or by
abandoning the Blue Chip Stamps Court's narrow interpretation of the
same language in the context of federal 10b-5 actions.
1. Overruling Blue Chip Stamps
The Supreme Court's ruling in Blue Chip Stamps, which adopted
the purchaser-seller requirement for plaintiffs suing under SEC's Rule
lOb-5, did not rely on a textual reading of that rule or Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act.13 0 Rather, the Court's decision was
based almost entirely on policy considerations.1 3 1 The Court gave
those considerations far too much weight in the decision.
One of the Court's chief concerns was the potential for vexatious
litigation or "strike suits" brought only to harass corporations and
127

See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87; supra text accompanying notes 67-68.

128

See Rose, supra note 48, at 462.
Dabit, 547 U.S. at 86.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734-49 (1975).

129

130
131
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attain undeserved settlements.13 2 The Court feared that allowing
holders to sue under Rule lOb-5 would encourage shareholders to
launch nonmeritorious actions against their corporations whenever
the stock price falls, and as long as the shareholders could survive the
dismissal or summary judgment phase, they could use abusive discovery practices to extort a settlement. 133 However, while the danger of
strike suits is theoretically possible, even before the Blue Chip Stamps
ruling, empirical studies suggested that in reality, strike suits appear to
be relatively uncommon. 134 Furthermore, developments in the law
since Blue Chip Stamps have made strike suits even less likely to
occur.1 3 5 Namely, the Reform Act's stay of discovery provision helps

to ensure that plaintiffs in securities litigation cannot abuse the discovery process to prevent an inadequate complaint from being dismissed,1 36 its heightened pleading standards discourage plaintiffs
13 7
from making assertions that they cannot support with evidence,
and the "lead plaintiff presumption" helps to ensure that securities
class actions will be led by large institutional investors, who are less
likely to bring frivolous claims.' 38 Since the provisions of the Reform
Act would apply to any holder action brought under Rule lOb-5, the
Supreme Court's concerns about strike suits and accompanying
abuses in the discovery process-while somewhat dubious when Blue
Chip Stamps was decided-are even less compelling today.
The Court in Blue Chip Stamps also expressed concerns about
"conjectural and speculative" recovery.1 39 Since the number of shares
a holder alleges he would have sold due to the corporation's fraud is a
subjective matter, the Court feared that allowing holder claims under
140
Rule lOb-5 would lead to recovery based on mere speculation.
While this may be a legitimate concern, it is one that should be
132 See id. at 740-41.
133 See id.
134 SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney'sRole in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 78 (1991).
135 SeeJones, supra note 10, at 637 (noting that the Reform Act and the Uniform
Standards Act have dramatically shifted the policy interests originally considered in
Blue Chip Stamps).
136 See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b) (2006).
137 See id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
138 See id. § 77z-1(b). In enacting the Reform Act, Congress realized that class
actions led by large institutional investors are more likely to be meritorious, since
institutional investors have the most to gain from meritorious suits but the most to
lose from frivolous ones. See Fulop, supra note 22, at 220.
139 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734-35 (1975).
140 See id.
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addressed on a case-by-case basis and does not justify eliminating
holder actions altogether. The problem of how to measure damages
is always difficult in fraud cases, "'since the person defrauded has,
because of the fraud, not pursued alternative courses of action, and
14 1
the results of those untaken courses therefore remain speculative.' "
Rather than simply eliminate plaintiffs' right to sue for fraud, however, courts routinely make this determination to the best of their ability. Many have simplified the process of determining certainty of
damages by establishing that "absolute certainty concerning the
amount of damage is not necessary to justify a recovery where the existence of damage is established" and that where such damage has been
established, the evidence need only show a basis for computing them
"'with a fair degree of probability.'" 142 The same principle could be
applied in holder cases. With the Enron scandal, where the company's stock became essentially worthless after a fraudulent scheme
was made public, 143 those who continued to hold their stock due to
the misrepresentations clearly suffered damage. It should be sufficient for such plaintiffs to establish their damages with a "fair degree
of probability." The question of holder action damages has been
addressed by state courts, which have suggested that damages may be
fairly calculated by comparing the stock prices before and after the
fraud is disclosed, though it may be necessary to require that the
only
plaintiff sell his stock after learning of the fraud to ensure that
14 4
recoverable.
be
may
damages
realized
actually
and
permanent
Courts could also alleviate the speculative damages concern by
requiring heightened pleading standards in holder actions similar to
the ones required by the Reform Act. The court in at least one state
law holder action, for example, required the plaintiffs to allege that
they actually read and relied upon a fraudulent prospectus and that
they would have sold a specific amount of shares at a specific time but
1 45
for the fraud.
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,14 6 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of loss causation in lOb-5 actions and held that a
141 Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 366-67
(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Leibert v. Fin. Factors, Ltd., 788 P.2d 833, 837 (Haw. 1990)).
142 Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting In re Application of Busse, 464 N.E.2d 651, 655 (111. App. Ct.
1984)).
143 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
144 See Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1266-71 (Cal. 2003) (Kennard, J.,
concurring).
145 See Rogers v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1311-14 (N.D. Fla. 2003).
146 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
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securities fraud plaintiff may not rely merely on the fact that misrepresentations inflated the price of securities but must actually prove that
the defendant's fraudulent conduct proximately caused the plaintiff's
economic loss. 1 4 7 The Dura ruling may make it more difficult for
plaintiffs in holder actions to recover and that counsels in favor of
permitting such actions under Rule lOb-5. The requirement that a
holder must prove that the defendant's misrepresentation proximately caused his economic loss would act as a further safeguard
against the speculative claims over which the Supreme Court
expressed concern in Blue Chip Stamps.
Since the policy considerations addressed by the Court in Blue
Chip Stamps do notjustify denying a federal forum to an entire class of
plaintiffs, especially in light of the Reform Act and other recent developments, the purchaser-seller requirement for lOb-5 actions should
be abandoned. Instead, legitimate policy concerns should be
1 48
addressed by courts on a case-by-case basis.
2.

Overruling Dabit

As an alternative to overruling Blue Chip Stamps and permitting
holder actions in federal court under Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court
could also overrule its decision in Dabit to the extent that it construes
the Uniform Standards Act to preempt state law holder class actions
and allow such actions to proceed in state court. Doing so would be
consistent with the Court's intention expressed in Blue Chip Stamps for
holders with genuine claims to be able to seek redress in state courts
and would also solve the problems created by effectively denying all
relief to defrauded securities holders.
Dabit could be readily overturned by applying a different textual
interpretation to the "in connection with" language in the Uniform
Standards Act. When the Court interpreted the nearly identical language of Rule lOb-5 in Blue Chip Stamps, it held that the language did
not encompass holder claims. 149 However, in Dabit, interpreting the
language in the context of the Uniform Standards Act, the Court
147 See id. at 346.
148 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 770 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Perhaps it is true that more cases that come within the Birnbaum doctrine can be properly proved than those that fall outside it. But this is no
reason for denying standing to sue to plaintiffs ... who allegedly are injured by novel
forms of manipulation. We should be wary about heeding the seductive call of expediency and about substituting convenience and ease of processing for the more difficult task of separating the genuine claim from the unfounded one.").
149 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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reached the opposite conclusion. 150 Although the Blue Chip Stamps
ruling was based largely on policy grounds and Dabit was based more
on textual interpretation and legislative intent,15 1 it is difficult to justify giving such conflicting meanings to the same language in two different securities laws. Moreover, it is not clear that the Court's
holding in Dabit even comports with the "broad" interpretation it has
given the "in connection with" language when it has interpreted that
language in the past. The Court has held that in order to satisfy this
requirement, a deceptive device must merely "coincide" with the
purchase or sale of securities. 15 2 In Dabit, however, the court of
appeals held that holder actions do not satisfy even this broad requirement, therefore they could not be encompassed by the Uniform Standards Act's preemption. 153 Although the Supreme Court did not
reach this portion of the lower court's holding in Dabit, this is one
possible basis for concluding that holder actions are not preempted
154
by the Uniform Standards Act.

Likewise, Dabit could conceivably be overturned upon a reexamination of the legislative intent behind the Uniform Standards Act. In
Dabit, the Court came to the conclusion that since they have long
given a broad interpretation to the "in connection with" language
found in the Act, Congress must have intended to incorporate that
settled meaning. The Court wrote:
Congress can hardly have been unaware of the broad construction adopted by both this Court and the SEC when it imported the
key phrase-"in connection with the purchase or sale"-into [the
Act's] core provision. And when 'judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the
same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the
1 55
intent to incorporate its... judicial interpretations as well."
However, the Court could just have easily reasoned that Congress was
well aware of the well-settled purchaser-seller rule that is derived from
that language at the time of the Uniform Standards Act's enactment.
In fact, that was exactly the conclusion that the Second Circuit
150

See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 84-86

(2006).
151 See id. at 84.
152 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655-56 (1997).
153 SeeDabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 34-35 (2d
Cir. 2005).
154 See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 77 n.3.

155 Id. at 85-86 (alterations in original) (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,
645 (1998)).
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reached in the same case, in evaluating legislative history and
15 6
intent.
Finally, Dabit could be overturned purely on policy grounds. For
the same reasons that the policy considerations underlying the Blue
Chip Stamps doctrine no longer necessitate a purchaser-seller requirement for federal actions brought under Rule 10b-5,157 the concerns
over allowing holder actions expressed by the Court in Blue Chip
Stamps and reiterated in Dabit do not justify eliminating holders' right
to sue in state court. Furthermore, the significant federalism concerns raised by the preemption of these actions 158 and the need to
provide defrauded shareholders a remedy by which they can recover
their economic losses also counsel in favor of abandoning Dabit's
interpretation of the Uniform Standards Act.
B.

Legislative Solutions

Although it is quite possible that Congress did not intend to create either the purchaser-seller requirement under Rule lOb-5 or the
sweeping preemption of state-law holder class actions, 159 both principles are now fairly well established but could easily be nullified by
Congressional action.
Creating a remedy for defrauded holders through legislative
action would carry all the benefits of the judicial solution but with
some added benefits as well. In enacting legislation that addresses
this problem, Congress could directly address the Supreme Court's
concerns by including specific provisions that create safeguards
against strike suits and speculative recovery.
For example, Congress could impose heightened pleading standards similar to those adopted by the Reform Act that would require
plaintiffs to plead facts giving rise to a "strong inference" that the
defendants acted with the requisite scienter. 160 Likewise, Congress
could also require corroborative evidence and oral testimony to establish reliance on the misrepresentation, as the SEC itself has proposed.' 6 ' Congress could also, if it saw fit, impose a requirement that
holder-plaintiffs sell the stock in question prior to bringing suit in
order to prevent unjust enrichment in the form of future, unrelated
156 Dabit, 395 F.3d at 34-35.
157 See supra Part III.A.1.
158 See supra Part II.C.
159 See supra Part III.A.
160 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (2006).
161 SeeJones, supra note 10, at 638. Interestingly, the SEC filed an amicus brief in
Blue Chip Stamps opposing the adoption of the purchaser-seller rule and has asked for
the rule's revision on several other occasions. See id. at 627.
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rises in the stock price. 162 By enacting legislation, Congress could
strike a much better balance between the interests of defrauded shareholders and corporations. Any limited remedies Congress afforded to
defrauded holders would drastically improve their current situation.
CONCLUSION

It is clear in light of the unprecedented fraudulent schemes seen
in recent years that enforcement of the securities laws, deterrence of
fraud, and protection for victims are all important considerations.
Although these policies have been hindered by recent developments
in the law that have effectively eliminated defrauded holders' ability to
seek redress for their injuries, Congress and the Supreme Court could
advance these goals once more by taking swift action to reauthorize
holder actions.
While many commentators have written about lessons to be
gleaned from Enron's collapse, 163 one of the most important lessons
can be garnered from the subsequent litigation. While many
defrauded former shareholders initially brought successful claims,
countless others lost their ability to seek recovery after the Dabit
Court's interpretation of the Uniform Standards Act. 164 The elimination of holders' ability to bring any claim whatsoever-regardless of
how meritorious-has dangerous and inequitable implications. Since
corporations do not internalize the full cost of their fraudulent acts if
individual holders cannot seek compensation for their losses, 165 denying these individuals the right to sue enables corporations to profit at
the expense of their investors by engaging in fraud. In order to prevent future instances of wide-scale fraud like the scheme perpetrated
by Enron and ensure that victims are compensated if it does occur,
Congress and the courts should work toward the "elimination of artificial barriers to recovery on just claims"1 6 6 by giving a remedy back to
defrauded securities holders.

162

See Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1266-71 (Cal. 2003) (Kennard, J.,

concurring).
163 See generally CORPoRATE AFTERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM THE
COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR CORPORATIONS (Christopher L. Culp & William A. Niskanen eds., 2003) (compiling numerous essays concerning the effects of

the Enron collapse).
164
165
166

See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747 (1975).
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